The record converse shoes illustrates that millions of dollars worth of ASICS' shoes are directly shipped into California, to a marketing subsidiary which ASICS purposefully established in California. Rather, the parent in Cascade had sent product to a Delaware subsidiary which had later sold it to independent firms which had then sent it to Oregon, the forum state. This is very much like the situation Judge Owen considered in the motion to dismiss the action from the New York forum. In O.S.C., the Circuit specifically noted that there had been no showing that the foreign parent had sent its goods to the subsidiary by way of the forum state, even though the court had specifically asked the plaintiff if that was the case. The opinion in O.S.C. distinguishes cases where the foreign parent actually sends product to the forum.

Even under Justice O'Connor's test, an affirmative act has occurred. ASICS' products were intentionally shipped to Californiaunlike the situation in Asahi where the Japanese company had no control over the fact that some of its product found its way into the state. The presence of the marketing liaison office in the state at least suggests that ASICS designs its products for the converse high tops California market. And, of course, ASICS markets the product through a distributor which has not only agreed to serve the market, but which was created by ASICS for that purpose and is a wholly owned subsidiary managed by ASICS officers. California is apparently the only state with which ASICS has sufficient contacts to establish jurisdiction.

See Williams Decla., Ex. 2 at 115. Even if it is converse womens assumed that the shoes are directly shipped to both of the warehouses from Asia, the earlier statement by Sakaguchi still provides sufficient evidence for the proposition that all or most of the product is shipped into California. At this stage of the proceeding, that is enough. Contrary to ASICS' assertions, the due process holding in Toyota is precisely on point, and the defendant is incorrect in analyzing the case's holding as being limited to tax matters. In support of that line of reasoning, ASICS has cited language in Toyota which was directed to the question of whether the tax code supplied a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction. See Toyota, supra, at 358 (refusing to interpret word "found" as used in the tax code in the same limited way it had been in converse cdg the antitrust area).

Mac Cormac completes the picture about metaphors by stating that resemblance and difference are also constituents when metaphor is at stake, together with similarity, as they are all involved in the knowledge process. One of the consequences is that the separation of metaphors from everyday language becomes impossible, and it is worth mentioning that Mac Cormac places the so-called dead metaphors within ordinary language. This patent infringement action was filed by Stuart Meyers against ASICS Corp. (ASICS), a Japanese manufacturer of sports shoes, on December 9, 1989. It came to this court as a low number transfer due to its relation to the case of Meyers v. ASICS Tiger Corp. (Tiger) CV 88-3071.

In that case, the plaintiff sued the American subsidiary of ASICS, alleging that the ASICS shoes which Tiger distributes in this country infringe the Meyers patent for a special sole and insole. Tiger is an independent American corporation wholly owned by ASICS. The case against Tiger was originally filed in this court but was transferred pursuant to the MDL procedure to the Southern District of New York for consolidated pretrial proceedings. According to the ASICS annual report, the parent set up Tiger "in the suburbs of Los Angeles as (its) major U.S. sales distribution center." The parent described the creation of the subsidiary as a move which "was certain to strengthen the Company's operations in the United States considerably." The shoes are sold by ASICS to Tiger on an FOB Japan, Korea, or Taiwan basis, with title being transferred to the American subsidiary prior to the time they are transported to the United States.

See Toyota, supra, at 358 (refusing to interpret word "found" as used in the tax code in the same limited way it had been in the antitrust converse white area). However, Judge Hall was merely noting that in all personal jurisdiction questions both statutory and Constitutional limits may apply. The discussion regarding the interpretation of the word "found" was clearly limited to the statutory issue. Hence, that section of the opinion does not apply to the case at hand. The due process holding in Toyota, on the other hand, is exactly on point. Judge Hall relied upon general Constitutional principles in reaching the decision, and thus, it is apparent that the holding is not limited to actions by the United States to collect taxes. Toyota, supra, at 359-360.